The evolution of modern voice-controlled devices (VCDs) has revolutionized the Internet of Things (IoT), and resulted in increased realization of smart homes, personalization and home automation through voice commands. These VCDs can be exploited in IoT driven environment to generate various spoofing attacks including the chain of replay attacks (multi-order replay attacks). Existing datasets like ASVspoof and ReMASC contain only the first-order replay recordings, therefore, they cannot offer evaluation of the anti-spoofing algorithms capable of detecting the multi-order replay attacks. Additionally, these datasets do not capture the characteristics of microphone arrays, which is an important characteristic of modern VCDs. Therefore, there exists an urgent need to have a diverse replay spoofing detection corpus that consists of multiorder replay recordings against the bonafide voice samples. This paper presents a novel voice spoofing detection corpus (VSDC) to evaluate the performance of multi-order replay anti-spoofing methods. The proposed VSDC consists of first-order-and second-order-replay samples against the bonafide audio recordings. We ensured to create a diverse replay spoofing detection corpus in terms of second-order-replays to generate a total of 11,772 samples belonging to fifteen human speakers. Additionally, the proposed VSDC can also be used to evaluate the performance of speaker verification systems. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first publicly available replay spoofing detection corpus comprising of first-order-and second-order-replay samples.
Introduction
The growing trend of personalization, realization of smart homes, and the desire for easy control of home devices are driving factors for the tremendous [19] .
The voice assistants have enabled enormous connectivity among VCDs and are opening vistas of new research [5] . Particularly, the addition of microphones arrays and speakers enable these devices to engage in two-way communication, allowing them to play audio and accept voice commands from other IoT devices.
The most recognizable feature of VCDs has been the capability to connect all household IoT devices together with voice commands. Voice assistants are now Most VCDs are equipped with array microphones which means they have more than one microphone. The Amazon Echo Dot 3 uses an array of 4 microphones.
This array of microphones allows the VCD to determine the location of the human speaker, selection of the best microphone and use the other microphones to reject background noise. This configuration allows VCDs to pick up voice command at long distances (few meters) in less than ideal conditions. This fact enables the VCD to be more susceptible to replay attacks.
Audio-specific spoofing attacks can be categorized into replay [12] , speechsynthesis (SS) [13] , voice conversion (VC) [14] and impersonation [17] . Among all audio spoofing attacks, replay attacks could be more prevalent in the future, as less tech savvy intruders can generate them and disrupt the automatic speaker verification system of a VCD based system [15] . Existing spoofing datasets [2, 3, 16] are designed for evaluation of testbeds that consider replay spoofing as a two-class classification problem. The application focus of these datasets is mainly evaluating voice driven banking systems and they only address the scenario of a one-time replay. However, we have demonstrated through the experimentation in our earlier work [5] that VCDs are very vulnerable to even second-order replay attacks and are unable to clearly classify between the original and spoof samples in multi-hop scenarios. This vulnerability of VCDs can easily be exposed by an intruder to cause severe financial loss and data theft. Additionally, existing datasets i.e. ASVspoof do not contains the audio samples recorded from devices having array of microphones. Therefore, there exists a need to create a replay spoofing dataset to evaluate applications and testbeds that may involve multi-hop voice propagation scenarios and samples recorded with devices having microphone arrays. For this purpose, we designed a novel voice spoofing detection corpus (VSDC) for multi-hop replay scenarios that consist of bonafide, first-order-and second-order-replay audio samples. Additionally, we tried to ensure that our replay dataset should be diverse in terms of recording environment, background noise, recording and playback devices, microphones, speakers, replay scenarios, etc. It is important to mention that the proposed dataset is unique and first-one to consider the multi-hop replay scenarios.
The main contributions of this paper are:
1. Development of a large-scale dataset for evaluation of audio forensics testbed.
2. Development of a multi-order replay dataset consisting of bonafide, first-order replay and second-order replay samples that can effectively be used to evaluate the performance of anti-spoofing methods in multi-hop scenarios.
3. We ensured to create a diverse replay spoofing detection corpus in terms of environment, recording and playback devices, human speakers, configurations, replay scenarios, etc. More specifically, we used 22 microphones, 25 unique recording configurations, 54 unique playback configurations to generate a total of 11772 samples belonging to fifteen human speakers of different age and gender.
Landscape of Multi-hop replay attacks
In this section we briefly discuss the landscape of replay attacks involving the voice-controlled devices (VCDs). The addition of a voice interface introduces a new attack surface to be exploited in homes, offices, businesses and hospitals.
These scenarios demonstrate that multiple-replays on the VCDs can be used to exploit the systems having voice interfaces. Although we discuss the scenarios of smart homes in this paper, the threats associated with the replay attacks can go beyond the homes and voice-controlled applications being developed for smart cities, futuristic cars, and other businesses. Amazon has already launched its smart assistant Alexa for businesses automation [7] . Currently, Amazon is working on healthcare apps that use smart speakers to perform various tasks [6] . The details of a few representative scenarios involving the multi-order replay attacks are discussed below. It is important to mention that we have experimentally verified these scenarios.
Scenario 1: Webcam Replay
Shown in Figure 2 While we proposed few scenarios, it can be assumed that the device with the weakest security will be exploited. Many VCDs such as webcams are known to have vulnerabilities that expose their credentials or audio streams due to the nature of being mass produced cheaply in quick time. Once a VCD has been exploited then an attacker can have multiple options from listening and collecting audio to replaying audio or cloned voice.
Dataset
This paper presents a unique voice spoofing detection corpus (VSDC) consisting of the bonafide, 1st-order and 2nd-order replay recordings by setting up different scenarios of chained VCDs. This multi-hop replay feature in our corpus can be used to evaluate the performance of different replay anti-spoofing algorithms in terms of classification among the bonafide, first-order and secondorder replay attacks. More specifically, our dataset can effectively be used to investigate the performance of audio replay spoofing detection algorithms under diverse recording and playback environments, configurations, and devices. Additionally, our proposed VSDC can also be used to evaluate the performance of speaker verification systems as our corpus includes the audio samples of fifteen different speakers. It must be noted that all audio samples in our dataset are of six (6) seconds in duration to ensure uniformity when using the bonafide and spoof samples to train different machine-learning classifiers.
Definitions and Data Collection Strategy
As this paper discusses the idea of multiple points/order of replays, we need to define the terminology used to specify the given point of replay. We will refer to the bonafide recording of a person giving voice commands to a VCD as the zero point of replay or (0PR). When the original recording is replayed from an audio speaker, we will refer to the output audio as the first point of replay or (1PR). Similarly, when the 1PR audio is replayed through a chained VCD then we will refer to that output audio as the second point of replay or (2PR).
Shown in Figure 3 is the process of capturing audio to create the dataset consisting of 0PR, 1PR and 2PR. The bonafide phrases (0PR files) can be captured on any recording device. The 0PR files are then copied to a PC for generating the replays. The PC replays the 0PR file to an audio speaker creating the 1PR audio. VCDs are setup in an audio conference mode so that the audio played at 1PR is replayed by the VCD at 2PR. The PC used for creating the data sample is simultaneously replaying the 0PR file while capturing the resulting 1PR and 2PR audio. The USB sound card connected to the PC in Figure 3 can be replaced by the onboard sound card of the PC or with a sound interface box.
For the data collection, we used the Audacity tool [9] to simultaneously play the 0PR audio while capturing the resulting 1PR and 2PR audio. The audacity tool can play from one audio track while simultaneously records audio on other tracks. To capture replays, a scenario is setup like two Amazon Echo devices in the conference mode to create a chain of VCDs. Audacity is setup with the bonafide (0PR) recording on track 1. The PC plays the audio to a connected audio speaker, this output audio is recorded on track 2 by Audacity and becomes the 1PR recording. At the same time, VCD replays the audio to the next device in the chain. The resulting output is recorded on track 3 by Audacity and becomes the 2PR recording. Using this method, we captured the 1PR and 2PR
replays in real time. It was necessary to maintain proper isolation between the 1PR and 2PR environments to ensure that each respective microphone would not receive the same sound as the other (e.g. the 2PR microphone would not overhear the sound coming from the audio speaker used in the 1PR environment). Audacity is then used to trim the samples into 6 second duration. All data samples at 0PR, 1PR and 2PR are exported as separate files.
Voice Commands and Recording Subjects
Shown in Table 1 given set of phrases typical of commands given to VCDs. Some of the volunteers recorded these original phrase sets multiple times using different microphones in diverse environments. In total 198 different 0PR source sets, consisting of at least 9 phrases, are created resulting in 1,926 0PR source phrases being spoken. 
0PR Environments
The 0PR environment is the area where the bonafide sound samples are Lab. All indoor environments contain less significant background noise from air circulation systems.
Playback Environments
For playback environments, we used the mini audio booths, lab classrooms, and library study rooms to create the 1PR and 2PR replays. The brief descrip- Study Room. We selected two study rooms inside the library to design the 1PR and 2PR playback environments (Figure 5b ). In the first study room, we setup the 1PR playback equipment that includes the laptop, one Echo dot device, microphone and connecting cables. In the second study room, we created the 2PR playback environments where we used an Echo dot device and a microphone connected with the cables. It should be mentioned that these study rooms 14 contained the noise from the air circulation system and footsteps.
Computer Lab. The computer lab playback environment used two computer labs adjacent to each other. One computer lab (Figure 5c ) is used for conducting the 1PR replay, where we placed a speaker, microphones and the Echo Dot in Drop-In mode. In the next computer lab, we arranged the other Echo Dot along with the necessary microphone to capture the 2PR playback. The computer labs contain the noise of air circulation systems only.
Equipment used for recording and playback
For recording the bonafide 0PR source files and the 1PR and 2PR replays, we used several combinations of microphones and microphone interface devices.
More specifically, we used 22 distinct microphones for audio recordings. Shown in Table 2 Table 2 . An external USB microphone is used for making 0PR recordings. This type of microphone can be characterized as a medium quality microphone and is highlighted in yellow in Table   2 . We also used various internal microphones of the laptops and cell phones.
Internal microphones can be characterized as lower quality microphones and are highlighted in red in Table 2 .
Shown in Table 3 are the fourteen (14) 1PR playback configurations used in the proposed VSDC. The composition of configurations consists of a speaker, amplifier, and a sound card. We used a variety of speakers ranging from low to high quality. Devices such as laptops and cell phones that contain built in speakers represent the low quality, whereas, those using an external speaker either connected via Bluetooth or aux cable are considered devices of medium quality. Finally, the higher quality speakers are considered to be the external Table 2 : List of all recording microphones and sound cards used.
0PR Recording Configuration
Audio 
1PR Playback Configuration
Polk Table 4 . The device configurations vary from Amazon Echos using the Drop-In audio conferencing feature to laptops and tablets connected using the Google Meet.
The Amazon Drop-In audio conferencing offers easy transmission of audio from one location to another using the VCDs. We used several different combinations of Amazon Echo devices to test their audio quality. All of the Amazon devices even the previous Generation 2 Echo Dot with smaller speakers are able to replay commands to another VCD with acceptable results. All Amazon Echo 
LG G6 Asus Tablet Google-Meet Laptop Laptop Google-Meet devices contain audio out jacks which allow them to be connected to external speakers for improved quality. We connected the external speakers for various sample sets to analyze the changes in the audio signal. We used a variety of external speakers ranging from small battery powered external speakers, home theater speakers to studio monitor speakers.
Google-Meet is used as an audio-conferencing service to transmit the 1PR audio to 2PR. While Google-Meet itself is used on laptops and tablets instead of the VCDs, still it is a useful way to replay audio to other VCDs. Laptops, tablets and phones can easily be left at other locations with the intention of replaying audio to VCDs at a later time. We used the laptops and Google-Meet to ensure the use of high-quality microphones. The audio quality of the replays is limited to the quality of Amazon Echos microphone in the configurations where we used the Amazon Echo devices. It can be expected that competition amongst the VCD manufacturers will continue to improve their audio capabilities likely to the point that products will become available for the audiophile market. Therefore, we conclude that it is worthwhile to study the audio characteristics of replay attacks on all types of audio equipment. 
Sample set 11 point of Replay (PR) 1PR
Speaker S2
Environment E6
Microphone used for recording M7
Configuration Number C28
Phrase 01
Data Availability
The dataset is organized into different folders, where each folder has all the recordings (0PR, 1PR and 2PR) of unique speaker. Each speaker folder contains three sub-folders including the audio samples of 0PR, 1PR and 2PR.
The naming convention of the file specifies the sample number, point of replay, speaker, environment, microphone at 0PR and configuration number as shown in Table 5 . The proposed voice spoofing detection corpus is available at [10] for research purposes.
Sample Set: Indicates the original 0PR file the sample is based from.
Point of Replay: Indicates at which point of replay this sample was created.
Speaker: Human speaker/volunteer who recorded this sample.
Environment: Recording Environment of the 0PR sample.
Microphone used for recording: The microphone that was used for the 0PR recording.
Configuration Number: The configuration setup that was used to make the 1PR and 2PR samples. Configuration is based on: Replay Speaker, Replay Device, 1PR to 2PR transmission device and method.
Phrase: In each configuration the volunteer spoke at least 9 phrases. This number indicates which phrase it is out of all the phrases spoken for that sample
The resulting filename looks like this: 11-1PR-S2-E6-M7-C8-01 Shown in Table 6 are the number of samples collected at each point of replay.
The word sample refers to each 6 second audio file that can have any phrase listed in Table 1 . The 0PR samples are the original bonafide phrases used.
The 0PR files are replayed multiple times with unique microphone and speaker configurations to create the 1PR and 2PR samples.
Experiments and Results
To indicate the significance of our dataset, we performed different experi- Therefore, we used the EER metric for ASVspoof 2017 and, EER and min-tDCF metrics [4] for ASVspoof 2019 to evaluate the performance.
Experiment-1: Training on ASVspoof dataset
We designed one experiment to investigate the capability of the ASV antispoofing system for replay detection in more diverse conditions. For this pur- As the ASVspoof baseline method is trained on the audio samples collected in the indoor environments with minimum distance between the speaker and microphone, therefore, we ensured to create a diverse spoofing dataset by recording and playback in different environments (ambient background noise to anechoic recording chamber), using different recordings and playback devices to maintain diversity in acoustics signatures, and recordings in multi-hop scenarios.
The results presented in Figure 6 clearly illustrate that ASV counter-preventive (CP) model has dependency on the environment, recording and playback settings/scenarios which makes this model unable to accurately detect the replay attacks under diverse environment conditions, and recording and playback scenarios. 
Experiment-3: Training on proposed VSDC for multi-order replay attacks
Our VSDC is unique to existing spoofing datasets in the way that we further categorize the spoofing samples into first-order and second-order replay attacks. We already demonstrated through experiments in our previous work [5] that ASV systems like Google Home and Amazon Alexa are even vulnerable to multi-hop scenarios (i.e. second-order replay attacks). Therefore, we argue that anti-spoofing systems must have the capability to accurately detect the second-order replay attacks as well besides the first-order replays. To test the effectiveness of our dataset in this perspective, we performed an experiment in two stages, one using the bonafide and first-order replay samples, and second using the bonafide and second-order replay samples.
In the first stage of this experiment, we evaluated the performance of ASV baseline method on our dataset using only the bonafide and first-order replay samples. For this purpose, we used 60% samples to train the ASV baseline method where half of the samples belong to the bonafide and rest to first-order replays. ASV baseline method provided an average EER of 20.54% on our dataset of bonafide and first-order replay samples as shown in Figure 10 . In the second stage of this experiment, we evaluated the ASV baseline method using only the bonafide and second-order replay samples. We used similar experimental settings as adopted for first-stage experiment (60% for training and 40% for testing) and obtained an average EER of 10.74% ( Figure 10 ). The results of this experiment indicate that the first-order replays are more challenging to detect as compared to second-order replay attacks indicating the fact that the characteristics of playback devices have some correlation with the spoof samples.
Conclusion
In this paper, we presented an audio replay spoofing dataset with the motivation to address the limitations of existing replay spoofing datasets. In comparison of existing datasets like ASVspoof, our proposed dataset is diverse in terms of recording and playback scenarios (i.e. second-order replay attack, etc.), devices, environment, etc. According to the best of our knowledge, it is the first attempt to create an audio spoofing dataset for multi-hop scenarios. After performance evaluation of ASVspoof baseline method on the proposed dataset we witnessed a significant performance degradation due to more diverse scenarios of our dataset. On the other hand, the baseline model trained on different diverse scenarios eventually found to perform better than the previous case. It has also been observed after experimentation that the discrimination between the bonafide and first-order replay samples is more challenging as compared to second-order replay samples. Moreover, we conclude that the characteristics of playback devices must also be thoroughly investigated to identify the difference in features of the first-order replay and second-order replay spoofing samples.
The proposed dataset contributes to the existing spoofing dataset mainly through adding more diversity in playback scenarios (i.e. multi-hop replay attack), recording environments, and professional microphones. ASVspoof being a crowdsource dataset possess enough diversity in terms of recording devices, environments, and playback scenarios and can be used to evaluate anti-spoofing methods for both replay attacks and cloning. On the contrary, our dataset is specifically designed for multi-order replay spoofing detection and diverse enough to be effectively used to evaluate the replay anti-spoofing methods. As we already discussed the importance of multi-hop replay attacks in MoT environment, our dataset can reliably be used to evaluate the performance of anti-spoofing systems capable of handling the multi-order replays. However, ASVspoof dataset is unable to handle the multi-hop replay scenario that also indicates the potential gap in ASVspoof dataset. Therefore, we argue that the proposed VSDC can effectively be used to develop more robust anti-spoofing methods under diverse recording and playback configurations, replay scenarios including multi-order replay attacks, and recording and playback environments.
